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SUPREME COURT - STATE OF NEW YORK
DUTCHESS COUNTY
Present:
Hon. MARIA G. ROSA
Justice.

REGINALD PETERSON,
Petitioner,
DECISION, ORDER &
JUDGMENT

-against-

Index No: 1732/2017
NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF PAROLE,
Respondent.

The following papers were read on this Article 78 proceeding:
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
PETITION
EXHIBITS 1 & 2
ANSWER AND RETURN
EXHIBITS 1-13
REPLY AFFIDAVIT
This is an Article 78 proceeding in which petitioner challenges the respondent New York
State Board of Parole's ("board") March 1, 2017 determination denying him parole release.
Petitioner was convicted after trial in 1993 of Manslaughter in the 1st Degree, Criminal Possession
of a Weapon in the 2"d Degree and Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the 3rd Degree. He was
sentenced to a term of eight and a third to 25 years on the manslaughter charge, 5-15 years on one
weapons charge and two and a third to seven years on the other weapon charge. The sentences were
ordered to run consecutively resulting in an aggregate term of imprisonment of 15 and two third
years to 47 years. His crimes of conviction stem from an incident in which he returned to the scene
of an altercation with a nine millimeter semi-automatic pistol and in an ensuing gun battle shot and
killed his victim. It was petitioner's first felony conviction but he had a prior juvenile adjudication
from an incident in which he stabbed and killed a 62 year old woman during a burglary and a 1989
misdemeanor assault conviction. Petitioner made his fifth appearance before the parole board on
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March 1, 2017. He appealed the board' s denial of release and the appeals unit affirmed. This
proceeding followed.
Petitioner claims that in denying parole release the board failed to consider all applicable
statutory factors, gave undue weight to the crime of conviction, considered factors it was not
permitted to consider under the Executive Law, relied on erroneous information in his COMPAS
report, failed to consider his youth as a mitigating factor and failed to state the reasons for denial in
detail.
Pursuant to Executive Law §259-i(2)(c), the New York State Board of Parole is required to
consider a number ofstatutory factors in determining whether an inmate should be released to parole.
See Matter of Miller v. NYS Div. of Parole, 72 AD3d 690 (2nd Dept. 2010). The parole board must
also consider whether "there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live
and remain at liberty without violating the law and that his release is not incompatible with the
welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for
the law.,, 9 NYCRR 8002. 1. A parole board is not required to give equal weight to each statutory
factor, nor is it required specifically to articulate every factor considered. See Matter of Huntley v.
Evans, 77 AD3d 945 (2°d Dept. 2010). It is further permitted to place a greater emphasis on the
gravity of offense committed. See Matter of Serrano v. Alexander, 70 AD3d 1099, 1100 (3ro Dept.
20 I 0). However, in the absence of aggravating circumstances, a parole board may not deny release
solely on the basis of the seriousness of the offense. Huntley v. Evans, 77 AD3d at 947; King v.
New York State Div. of Parole, 190 A.D.2d 423 (1 51 Dept. 1993). Moreover, while the board need
not consider each guideline separately and has broad discretion to consider the importance of each
factor, the board must still consider the guidelines. Executive Law§ 259-i(2)(a). Finally, the board
must inform the inmate in writing of the factors and reasons for denial of parole and"[s]uch reasons
shall be given in detail and not in conclusory terms." Executive Law §259-i(2)(a); Malone v: Evans,
83 AD3d 719 (2"d Dept. 2011 ). A determination by a parole board whether or not to grant parole is
discretionary, and if made in accordance with the relevant statutory factors, is not subject to judicial
review absent "a showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety." Matter of Russo v. NYS Bd.
of Parole, 50 NY2d 69, 77 (1980).
Executive Law §259-c(4) was amended in 2011 to require the board to establish new
procedures to use in making parole determinations. The statutory amendment was intended to have
parole boards focus on an applicant's rehabilitation and future rather than giving undue weight to
the crime of conviction and the inmate's pre-incarceration behavior. To assist the members of the
board in taking this approach when making parole determinations, the amendment required the
establishment of written guidelines incorporating risk and needs principles to measure an inmate's
rehabilitation and likelihood of success upon release. See Ramfrez v. Evans, -AD3d-, 2014 WL
2504724 (2"d Dept., June 4, 2014). In response, the board of parole adopted the COMPAS
(Correctional Offonder Management Profiling for Alternative Sanction) assessment tool. A
COMPAS assessment was prepared in connection with petitioner's March 1, 2017 appearance before
the parole board.
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At petitioner's parole hearing, the board questioned him about his crimes of conviction, his
juvenile adjudication, how his upbringing impacted his criminal history, his marriage, a positive
behavioral change while incarcerated as well as discussed his plans for release, institutional
achievements and prison disciplinary history. Petitioner spoke at length about how his
disadvantaged childhood resulted in him engaging in criminal behavior. Petitioner further
acknowledged that he had a significant disciplinary record while incarcerated but that at some point
made a conscious decision to change his behavior. The board acknowledged that petitioner had
"turned a corner" and that his COMP AS assessment found him to be a low risk of felony violence,
re-arrest or absconding. The board further acknowledged that petitioner had made productive use
of his leisure time, pursued educational and employment opportunities while incarcerated and
petitioner's family ties but denied parole release finding that elements of petitioner's youth continued
to plague him. The board recommended that he avail himself of resources available to him. The
board's decision further stated that it considered the requisite statutory factors including his
institutional adjustment, discipline and program participation, risk needs assessment and needs for
successful re-entry into the community. Ultimately, however, the board found more compelling his
crimes of incarceration and determined that if released there was a reasonable probability that
petitioner would not live and remain at liberty and that his release would be incompatible with the
welfare and safety of society.
Based on the above, the court is without a basis to find that the board failed to consider the
requisite statutory factors or gave undue weight to petitioner's crimes of conviction. The minutes
of the parole hearing make clear that the board adequately considered the relevant statutory factors
including his COMP AS re-entry risk assessment. While there may have been minor errors in the
COMPAS assessment that erroneously stated petitioner had two prior felony assault offenses and
one prior adult weapons offense, the court does not find these errors warrant vacatur of the parole
board's determination. The parole board expressly acknowledged that petitioner's COMPAS
assessment overall did not find him to be a high risk for a recidivism. Moreover, the board's
comments at the hearing reflect that it was aware that petitioner is currently incarcerated for his first
felony conviction and that he had a prior juvenile adjudication, not a felony conviction. The
erroneous information as to petitioner's age when he was first arrested was not prejudicial to
petitioner. The record further supports the indication that petitioner had a notable disciplinary record
while incarcerated as the board express!y referenced an array of Tier III infractions while noting that
petitioner's last disciplinary infraction was in 2013 . The court further rejects petitioner's claim that
comments of board members demonstrate that it improperly considered factors outside of the
Executive Law. The court has reviewed such comments and found that they were part of a dialogue
with petitioner and an attempt to provide guidance as to a behavior that could benefit his chances
for parole release. Nothing therein indicates that the board imposed a higher standard for petitioner's
release than authorized by law.
Petitioner's reliance upon the constitutional requirement that a parol board consider the
significance of an inmate's youth and attendant circumstances at the time of the commission of a
crime before making a parole determination is misplaced. See generally, Hawkins v NYS
Department of Corrections and Comrnunitv Supervision, 140 AD3d 34 (3'd Dep't 2016). This
3

requirement applies to parole considerations for juvenile offenders sentenced to life without parole
for the purpose of ensuring compliance with the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and
unusual punishment. See Montgomery v Louisiana, 136 S.Ct. 718 (2016). Petitioner is not currently
incarcerated for a crime committed when he was a juvenile and thus his current sentence does not
implicate the Eighth Amendment. Finally, the parole board's written decision adequately sets forth
the reasons for the denial of parole and thus complies with Executive Law §259-i (2)(a).
Based on the foregoing, it is hereby
ORDERED that the petition is denied.
This constitutes the decision, order and judgment of the court.
Dated: October 11', 2017
Poughkeepsie, New York

ENTER:

MARIA G. ROSA, J.S.C.

Reginald Peterson DIN#92A5540
Otisville Correctional Facility
PO Box 8
Otisville, NYl 0963
State of New York
Office of the Attorney General
One Civic Center Plaza, Suite 401
Poughkeepsie, NY 12601-3157

Pursuant to CPLR §SS 13, an appeaJ as of right must be taken. within thirty days after service by a
party upon the appellant of a copy of lhe judgment or order appealed from and written notice of
its entry, except that when the appellant has served a copy of the judgment or order and written
notice of its entry, the appeal must be taken within thirty days thereof.
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